Editorial Note: Despite national guidelines recommending routine chlamydia screening (1,2), the data in this report suggest that screening rates remain low among enrollees in both commercial and Medicaid plans. These rates are lower than rates for all other women's health services measured by HEDIS, including Pap tests to screen for cervical cancer (61% in Medicaid and 80% in commercial plans in 2001) (3). Chlamydia screening rates might be higher in Medicaid than in commercial plans because of health-care providers' beliefs that Medicaid patients are at higher risk for STDs.
Chlamydia Screening Among Sexually Active Young Female Enrollees of Health Plans -United States, 1999-2001
Chlamydia trachomatis infection is the most commonly reported sexually transmitted disease (STD) in the United States, with the highest rates among adolescent females and young women. Approximately 5%-14% of routinely screened females aged 16-20 years and 3%-12% of women aged 20-24 years are infected with chlamydia (1) . Because up to 70% of chlamydial infections in women are asymptomatic, routine screening and treatment of infected persons is essential to prevent pelvic inflammatory disease, infertility, ectopic pregnancy, and perinatal infections. Since the 1990s, CDC, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, and several clinical organizations have recommended routine screening for chlamydial infection for all sexually active women aged <26 years and for pregnant women of all ages (1, 2) . To evaluate rates of chlamydia screening among sexually active young females, CDC analyzed 1999-2001 data from the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS ® ) reported by commercial and Medicaid health insurance plans. This report summarizes the results of that analysis, which determined that screening rates were low despite slight increases in screening covered both by commercial and Medicaid plans during 1999-2001. Increased screening by health-care providers and coverage of screening by health plans will be necessary to reduce substantially the burden of chlamydial infection in the United States.
HEDIS includes voluntarily reported performance measures of health plans and is maintained by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), a private, not-for-profit organization that monitors the quality of health plans. HEDIS allows health insurance purchasers and consumers to compare health plan performance and enables health plans to benchmark their performance.
During 1999-2001, a total of 335 commercial health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and point-of-service (POS) plans and 92 Medicaid HMO and POS plans reported chlamydia screenings. These data accounted for 83% of enrollees in commercial HMO and POS plans and up to 30% of enrollees in Medicaid HMO and POS plans in the United States during this period. Since 1999, NCQA has measured chlamydia screening rates of sexually active female enrollees in these health plans by using medical claims and pharmacy data. The denominator represents the number of sexually active female enrollees aged 16-26 years who were continuously enrolled during the preceding calendar year. Being sexually active was defined as receipt of a contraceptive prescription or submission of a medical claim associated with pregnancy, contraceptives, STDs, or Papanicolaou (Pap) test during the preceding year. The numerator represents the number of eligible female enrollees who had a claim for chlamydia tests. Mean chlamydia screening rates were weighted to account for the differences in the number of sexually active female enrollees aged 16-26 years across health plans.
Among sexually active female enrollees aged 16-26 years in commercial plans, 20% were screened for chlamydia in 1999, 25% in 2000, and 26% in 2001. Among enrollees aged 16-26 years in Medicaid plans, screening rates were 28% in 1999, 36% in 2000, and 38% in 2001. Among enrollees aged 16-20 years in commercial plans, 22% were screened in 1999, offering chlamydia screening; and 4) lack of knowledge of the availability of urine-based chlamydia screening tests. Patient factors include 1) the stigma associated with STDs; 2) lack of awareness of the high prevalence, asymptomatic nature, and serious complications of chlamydial infection; 3) the presence of parents during the examinations of adolescents, which precludes confidential sexual risk assessment; and 4) fears about breaches of confidentiality regarding sexual health services or diagnoses noted in medical records or bills (5) .
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, HEDIS data reflect screenings reported by HMO and POS plans that covered only approximately 30% of U.S. residents in 2001. Second, HEDIS estimates might underestimate or overestimate actual screening rates for these health plan enrollees. HEDIS depends on routinely collected administrative data to facilitate data collection within plans and allow comparison across plans. However, if a substantial proportion of sexually inactive enrollees had claims for pregnancy tests or oral contraceptives for reasons not related to sexual activity, or if medical claims did not identify all chlamydia tests ordered, HEDIS data would underestimate actual screening rates. Overestimation might occur if a substantial proportion of sexually active enrollees lacked claims for pregnancy, contraceptives, STDs, or Pap tests that would classify them as sexually active in administrative data (5) , or if the measure's numerator included claims for chlamydia tests used to diagnose illness in symptomatic patients (5) . Overestimation also might result if health plans that perform well on the chlamydia screening measure are more likely to report their results to NCQA than those that do not perform as well. Continued evaluation is needed of how well administrative data used for HEDIS measures reflect actual practice.
The findings in this report highlight the need for interventions to increase chlamydia screening, improve quality of care, and reduce the estimated $249 million direct medical costs of chlamydia and its sequelae for adolescents and young adults (6) . Interventions are especially important in commercial plans, given that two thirds of women of reproductive age (15-44 years) in the United States are commercially insured (7) and only 13% of chlamydial infections in the CDC surveillance system are reported by public STD clinics (8) . System-level interventions in large commercial plans have substantially increased chlamydia screening rates of sexually active young women within 2 years (9, 10) . One intervention increased screening from 5% to 65% by 1) informing providers about high chlamydia prevalence, 2) implementing procedures allowing adolescents some encounter time without parents, and 3) providing urine tests and monthly provider feedback on screening rates (9) . Another intervention, which included "championing" of screening by health-plan leaders and routine placement of chlamydia specimen collection materials next to Pap test collection kits, increased screening from 61% to 83% (10) . Such system-level interventions should complement provider and patient education. In addition, including chlamydia screening as one of the HEDIS measures used to accredit health plans by NCQA might provide motivation to increase screening. This report describes the ongoing investigation of the LGV outbreak. Health-care providers should be vigilant for LGV, especially among MSM exposed to persons from Europe, and prepared to diagnose the disease and provide appropriate treatment to patients and their exposed sex partners (Box). The cases in the Netherlands were investigated by staff members of public health services, academic medical centers, and the National Institute of Public Health and Environment. After the initial 13 cases were reported, efforts were implemented to increase awareness of the outbreak among health-care providers, staff at human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-treatment centers and STD clinics, and members of the MSM community. As a result, an additional 17 confirmed cases and 40 probable cases that occurred in 2003 were identified retrospectively.
MMWR
LGV was diagnosed by conducting polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests on rectal swab specimens and performing subsequent restriction endonuclease pattern analysis of the amplified outer membrane protein A gene to determine the genotype. Confirmed cases were those in patients with 1) proctitis or contact with a patient confirmed with LGV; 2) a positive PCR test for C. trachomatis on a urine or rectal specimen; and 3) L1, L2, or L3 genotype determined by PCR. Probable cases were those in patients whose illness was consistent with the first two criteria and who also had a positive serologic test for C. trachomatis, but did not meet the third criterion because specimens were not available for genotyping. Possible cases were in patients who met only the first criterion and had a positive serologic test.
Increased awareness of the LGV outbreak resulted in retrospective reporting of 2003 cases and reporting of 62 confirmed cases in 2004, as of September 1. Additional epidemiologic information was obtained on these 62 patients. Preliminary evaluation determined that all the patients were white and that, among the 30 MSM whose HIV status was known, 23 (77%) were HIV positive. Other preliminary findings suggested that concurrent sexually transmitted infections were prevalent and that the majority had participated in casual sex gatherings (e.g., "leather scene" parties) and unprotected anal intercourse or other unprotected anal penetration (e.g., fisting) during the 12 months before onset of symptoms.
BOX. Etiology, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, and treatment of lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV)

Etiology
• LGV is caused by Chlamydia trachomatis serovars L1 to L3. (C. trachomatis serovars B and D-K are responsible for the syndromes of non-gonococcal urethritis and cervicitis.) Clinical manifestations • The primary lesion produced by LGV is a small, nonpainful genital papule, which can ulcerate at the site of inoculation after an incubation period of 3-30 days. This lesion can remain undetected within the urethra, vaginal vault, or rectum.
• Common clinical manifestations include 1) tender, unilateral, or bilateral inguinal and/or femoral adenopathy, which can become fluctuant; and 2) hemorrhagic proctitis or proctocolitis, which is associated with receptive anal intercourse (1) . The clinical and histologic presentation of LGV protocolitis can be similar to the initial manifestations of inflammatory bowel disease (2) . Diagnosis • Diagnosis is based primarily on clinical findings; routine laboratory confirmation might not be possible.
• Serologic tests for C. trachomatis (i.e., microimmunofluorescence or complement fixation) can support diagnosis.
• Direct identification of C. trachomatis from a lesion (i.e., bubo) or site of the infection (e.g., rectum) can be made by using culture or by using nonculture nucleic acid testing; however, neither method is specific for LGV, and use of rectal swabs for nucleic acid testing is not cleared by the Food and Drug Administration. Treatment • The recommended treatment is administration of 100 mg of doxycycline, twice a day for 21 days. Alternative treatment is 500 mg of erythromcyin base orally, four times a day for 21 days. Some specialists in sexually transmitted diseases believe 1 g of azithromycin, administered orally once weekly for 3 weeks, is effective; however, clinical data are lacking. • Sex partners who had contact with the patient within 30 days of the patient's onset of symptoms should be evaluated; in the absence of symptoms, they should be treated with either 1 g of azithromycin in a single dose, or 100 mg of doxycycline, twice a day for 7 days.
Editorial Note: Although some of the patients in this LGV outbreak reported having multiple sex partners in cities in Europe and the United States (2), limited information has been reported regarding LGV occurrence outside the Netherlands. However, recent reports from Belgium, France, and Sweden confirm that LGV is occurring elsewhere in Europe (5, 6) . Additional reports might follow increased awareness of the outbreak (7). In July 2004, CDC identified an L2
LGV strain on a rectal swab specimen from a patient in the United States who had signs and symptoms similar to those of the patients in the Netherlands. In this case, no known exposure to European MSM was reported; U.S. contacts of the patient were evaluated and treated. Health-care providers and MSM in the United States and Europe should be aware of this LGV outbreak, which is similar to STD increases (e.g., in syphilis, rectal gonorrhea, and quinolone-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae and including coinfections with HIV) that have been reported in recent years among MSM (8, 9) . The ulcerative character of LGV can facilitate transmission and acquisition of HIV and other STDs or bloodborne diseases.
The number of cases reported in the Netherlands is likely a minimum estimate of disease occurrence; clinicians in industrialized countries diagnose LGV rarely and would usually not consider LGV as a likely cause of gastrointestinal illness. Estimates of the incidence and prevalence of LGV in the United States are difficult to obtain; the disease is not nationally reportable, and the diagnosis is not straightforward. The clinical presentation of LGV might easily be missed, as evidenced by the large number of retrospective cases identified in the Netherlands.
The laboratory criteria consistent with a diagnosis of LGV include a positive result (i.e., titer >1:64) on a complement fixation test for chlamydiae or a high titer (i.e., typically >1:128, but can vary by laboratory) on a microimmunofluorescence serologic test for C. trachomatis. However, most available serologic tests in the United States are based on enzyme immunoassays and might not provide a quantitative "titer-based" result. A list of laboratories that perform serologic tests for C. trachomatis and might provide a titered result is available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/lgv-labs.htm.
CDC and other laboratories are evaluating molecular approaches compliant with Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendment regulations that will permit specific diagnoses of LGV. CDC advises clinicians who care for MSM to consider LGV in the diagnosis of compatible syndromes (e.g., proctitis and proctocolitis) and perform tests to diagnose C. trachomatis infections, without regard to the specific LGV serovars. Recommended treatment regimens for those suspected of having LGV and their sex partners are offered (Box).
Evaluation of gastrointestinal syndromes that might have been sexually transmitted should include appropriate diagnostic procedures (e.g., anoscopy or sigmoidoscopy) and microbiologic testing for C. trachomatis, syphilis, herpes, N. gonorrhoeae, and common enteric pathogens that can be sexually transmitted. Clinicians who identify cases compatible with LGV (e.g., proctitis associated with serologic or microbiologic evidence of chlamydial infection) should contact CDC at 404-639-2059 and local health departments. On July 26, 2003, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (LACDHS) received a report that a local clinical laboratory had isolated from specimens Burkholderia pseudomallei, a category B biologic terrorism agent and the causative organism for melioidosis, which is endemic to certain tropical areas. Because laboratory workers had manipulated cultures of the organism, CDC was asked to assist in the subsequent investigation. This report summarizes the results of that investigation, which included assessment of laboratory exposures, postexposure chemoprophylaxis, and serologic testing of exposed laboratory workers. The findings underscore the need to reinforce proper laboratory practices and the potential benefits of chemoprophylaxis after laboratory exposures.
The specimens were taken from a man aged 47 years with diabetes mellitus who had been evaluated at a local emergency department (ED) for fever, chills, and chest and leg pain. He had traveled to El Salvador 3 weeks earlier and returned 3 days before visiting the ED. During the preceding 2 weeks, the man had intermittent fever and night sweats. In the ED, a chest radiograph revealed bilateral and multifocal infiltrates, and he was admitted to the hospital; a computed tomography imaging scan indicated the presence of pulmonary abscesses. During the next 2 days, his condition deteriorated, requiring intubation and mechanical ventilation for respiratory failure; he died from fulminant sepsis and multiorgan system failure. An autopsy revealed acute necrotizing pneumonia, multiple renal abscesses, and cirrhosis.
During the patient's hospitalization, seven specimens of blood, urine, sputum, and bodily fluid were obtained; 2 days after the patient's death, bacterial isolates from all specimens were presumptively identified as B. pseudomallei by the laboratory's automated identification system and subsequently confirmed by polymerase chain reaction at the LACDHS Public Health Laboratory. A total of 17 laboratory workers had manipulated cultures from these specimens. These workers were considered exposed and were offered antibiotic chemoprophylaxis within 48 hours of their exposures.
An onsite investigation was conducted on August 7. Laboratory procedures were reviewed and work activities classified into high and low risk. High-risk activities were defined as those that might result in organism-containing aerosol or droplet formation. High-risk activities included sniffing open culture plates to detect characteristic odors emitted by certain bacteria and preparing suspensions from culture plates using a vortex machine. High-risk activities also included routine laboratory procedures when not performed in a biological safety cabinet (BSC), such as picking colonies, subculturing, inoculating biochemical tests, centrifuging, and preparing slides. Manipulations of cultures inside a BSC were classified as low-risk exposures. On August 11, exposed workers completed a questionnaire regarding demographics, medical and travel histories, and work activities performed on the B. pseudomallei cultures. Active surveillance was conducted for symptoms consistent with melioidosis among exposed workers. Finally, serum specimens were obtained for anti-B. pseudomallei antibody testing from all exposed workers at 1, 2, 4, and 6 weeks after exposure. Serologic testing was performed by using an indirect hemagglutination test at PathCentre (Nedlands, Australia), with a positive result defined as a titer >40 (1).
All 17 exposed workers completed the questionnaire. The median age was 48 years (range: 36-59 years). All reported >10 years of laboratory work experience (Table) . Five persons (29%) reported an underlying condition, such as diabetes, that might put them at risk for severe disease. Eight (47%) reported having traveled to Southeast Asia during their lifetimes. Thirteen (77%) reported high-risk activities, including four (24%) who reported sniffing an open B. pseudomallei culture plate because of the distinctive "earthy" odor.
Sixteen workers completed a 3-week regimen of trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, and one completed a 3-week regimen of doxycycline. Antibiotics were begun at a median of 2 days' postexposure (range: 0-4 days). None of the exposed laboratory workers had symptoms consistent with melioidosis during 5 months after exposure. Two laboratory workers had titers of <20 for B. pseudomallei on the first serum drawn. Both workers were born in the United States, and neither demonstrated an increase in titer 6 weeks after exposure. The first (no. 17) reported sniffing a B. pseudomallei culture plate. The worker recalled previous travel to Hawaii, Europe, Mexico, and Jamaica but reported no previous illnesses consistent with melioidosis. The second worker (no. 1) reported low-risk activities. The worker reported previous travel to the Philippines and Singapore and was hospitalized in 2001 for pneumonia with pleural effusions requiring thoracenteses; no pathogen was identified.
Although the occurrence of potentially high-risk work activities performed outside a BSC were documented, no laboratory workers in this investigation were infected with B. pseudomallei. In response to this incident, laboratory safety recommendations for B. pseudomallei were reviewed; the laboratory had existing policies against sniffing all culture plates and continued to prohibit this and other unsafe laboratory practices.
Editorial Note: This report describes the investigation into the exposure of 17 laboratory workers to the gram-negative bacillus B. pseudomallei, which causes melioidosis infection. The majority of infections with B. pseudomallei are asymptomatic (1). Symptomatic disease can be in localized or septicemic forms. Foci of infection include lung, skin, and genitourinary tract. Although infection can occur in healthy persons, B. pseudomallei is an opportunistic pathogen. Underlying immunosuppressing conditions, including diabetes mellitus, chronic renal failure, and alcohol abuse, are risk factors for septicemic melioidosis. Hypotension, absence of fever, leucopenia, and abnormal renal and hepatic function are poor prognostic features (2) .
B. pseudomallei is endemic to Southeast Asia and northern
Australia, but sporadic cases have been reported from other tropical and subtropical areas between 20 º north and south latitudes, including El Salvador (3). The primary route of infection is thought to be inoculation; however, infection might occur through inhalation, aspiration, and ingestion. The environmental reservoirs for B. pseudomallei are surface water and soil (4) . The median incubation period of melioidosis is 9 days (range: 1-21 days), although reactivation of previously asymptomatic disease can occur after months or years (5) .
Two laboratory-acquired infections have been reported previously (6, 7) . A case of pneumonia, epididymo-orchitis, and a leg abscess occurred in a previously healthy laboratory worker. These conditions were associated with open-flask sonication of a suspension of organisms outside of a BSC, presumably resulting in inhalational exposure. In addition, a previously healthy bacteriologist had tender right axillary lymphadenopathy and pneumonia after cleaning a leaking centrifuge tube without wearing gloves. The worker reported having an ulcerative lesion on one finger at the time of the incident, suggesting that infection occurred via inoculation. After appropriate treatment, both patients recovered without adverse sequelae.
Biosafety level (BSL) 2 practices, equipment, and containment are recommended for working with known or potentially infectious body fluids, tissue specimens, or cultures. However, a review of work in a clinical laboratory in an area in which melioidosis is endemic indicated low risk to laboratory workers (8) . The laboratory described in that report followed BSL-2 precautions, with aerosol-generating procedures performed in a Class II or higher BSC, whereas new or Recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole or doxycycline for 3 weeks were based on in vitro and animal data; no published data for humans are available. Current treatment recommendations for melioidosis comprise an initial, intensive phase followed by eradication therapy (Box) (4) .
As the findings in this report indicate, potentially unsafe laboratory practices such as sniffing opened culture plates can occur before isolates are identified. Such practices should be prohibited, especially given that B. pseudomallei can be misidentified by biochemical substrate utilization tests (9) . Because infection with B. pseudomallei can be severe, PEP with doxycycline (2 mg/kg up to 100 mg orally, twice daily) or trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (8 + 40 mg/kg up to 320 + 1,600 mg orally, twice daily) can be considered if cultures of the organism are inadvertently manipulated outside of BSL-2 conditions. Animal data suggest that 5 days of PEP might be insufficient to prevent infection (10 
Laboratory Network Performance
The global polio laboratory network, which operates in all six WHO regions, comprises 123 national facilities, 15 regional reference laboratories, and seven global specialized laboratories. High-quality performance is ensured through a WHO-administered laboratory accreditation program with a comprehensive annual review of criteria related to timely and accurate laboratory results. Of the 145 network laboratories, 139 (96%) were fully accredited by WHO in 2003. Three laboratories that passed annual proficiency tests but were deficient in some other aspect of performance were provisionally accredited. Three laboratories were not accredited because they failed the annual proficiency test. Nonaccredited laboratories split samples for parallel testing in accredited laboratories while implementing measures to improve performance.
During 
VDPVs
Vaccine-derived polioviruses, defined as viruses with >1% sequence differences compared with Sabin vaccine virus of the same serotype, are also detected by the laboratory network (Table 3) . Although VDPVs previously have been shown to circulate in Egypt, Hispaniola, Madagascar, and Philippines The laboratory network has achieved a high quality of performance and accuracy, achieving the program standard of providing virology results for more than 80% of persons with AFP within 60 days of paralysis onset. To minimize reporting delays, the network routinely monitors and analyzes the timeliness of all stages of AFP case investigation, including sample collection, shipment, and testing. These analyses reveal that the logistics of sample and isolate shipment remain the biggest challenge to providing timely results. Shipping isolates between laboratories usually takes 5-7 days but can take substantially longer in certain locations. To improve the timeliness of isolate shipment, the network plans to make ITD testing available in laboratories in Côte d'Ivoire, IbadanNigeria, and Senegal, which serve 14 African countries. As a result of enhanced surveillance efforts to identify the last remaining WPV transmission chains, several laboratories in regions where WPV is endemic have experienced substantial workload increases, necessitating additional resources to meet demands for culture supplies, equipment, and trained personnel.
Policies for eventual cessation of oral poliovirus-vaccine (OPV) use depend on an assessment of VDPV risk. The laboratory network has a critical role in generating data to estimate the frequency of VDPVs and monitoring their ability to cause paralysis or to circulate. Cumulative data since 1999 suggest that approximately 0.5% of all Sabin-related isolates are classified as VDPVs. All VDPV isolates from any source should be investigated to identify either unrecognized circulation or the presence of a chronically infected immunodeficient person in the community. Investigation of reported VDPV isolates revealed immunodeficient persons with AFP from Thailand and Peru in 2003. These persons did not excrete VDPVs for prolonged periods; no VDPVs were isolated from their follow-up stool samples. Investigation of VDPVs in Slovakia has not revealed gaps in vaccination coverage nor identified paralyzed persons in the communities in which VDPVs were detected. Health officials are continuing efforts to identify the source of these viruses.
Poliovirus surveillance should continue for >3 years after OPV cessation, implying that laboratory support might be needed through 2011. WHO has initiated discussions with national governments and partner agencies regarding the future of network laboratories. WHO is also pursuing greater government support of laboratories to facilitate the transition to other high-priority public health activities and to maximize the investments made in developing highquality laboratory services. Continued involvement of national governments and partner agencies † is essential to sustain highquality laboratory performance. 
Update
United States
Until recently, in the United States, national influenza surveillance was conducted by four systems that operated during October-May. One of these systems consists of approximately 1,000 sentinel health-care providers, who regularly report data to CDC on patient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI). In addition, during 2004, approximately 350 sentinel providers continued to submit weekly reports during May-September. A second system consists of approximately 120 U.S.-based World Health Organization (WHO) and National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) collaborating laboratories; these laboratories report the number of respiratory specimens tested and the number and types of influenza viruses identified throughout the year.
For the 2004-05 influenza season, CDC has added two new surveillance systems: one that tracks naturally reported pediatric deaths associated with laboratory-confirmed influenza infections and another that tracks hospitalizations associated with laboratory-confirmed influenza infections in children aged <18 years. The latter system, which will continue at a minimum of nine sites through CDC's Emerging Infections Program, augments CDC's ongoing surveillance at the three National Vaccine Surveillance Network sites of children aged <5 years hospitalized with fever or respiratory illness.
During May 23-October 2, the weekly percentage of patient visits to sentinel providers for ILI ranged from 0.4% to 0.8%. WHO and NREVSS collaborating laboratories tested 11,916 respiratory specimens; 54 (0.5%) were positive for influenza. Of the positive results, 29 (54%) were influenza B viruses, 14 (26%) were influenza A (H3N2) viruses, and 11 (20%) were influenza A viruses that were not subtyped. Both influenza A and B viruses were reported during late MaySeptember 2004.
During October 3-16, influenza activity occurred at low levels in the United States. Since October 3, WHO and NREVSS collaborating laboratories in the United States have tested 1,414 respiratory specimens; eight (0.6%) were positive. Of these, six were influenza A viruses, and two were influenza B viruses. The proportion of patient visits to sentinel providers for ILI and the proportion of deaths attributed to pneumonia and influenza were below baseline levels. During the week ending October 16, nine states and New York City reported sporadic influenza activity, and 40 states and the District of Columbia reported no influenza activity.
Worldwide
During May-July, influenza A (H3N2) viruses predominated in Africa (Madagascar, Senegal, and South Africa). In Asia, influenza A (H3N2) viruses predominated in China, Hong Kong, and Thailand and also were reported in Japan. Influenza A (H3N2) viruses were responsible for regional outbreaks in Taiwan in August and September (2) .
In Oceania (Australia, New Caledonia, and New Zealand), influenza A (H3N2) viruses predominated and were associated with multiple nursing home outbreaks in Australia and New Zealand in August and September. In South America, influenza A (H3N2 and non-subtyped) viruses predominated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Influenza A (H3N2) viruses were associated with widespread outbreaks in Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay during May-June.
During May-July, influenza A (H1N1) viruses predominated in the Philippines and also were reported in China, Japan, New Caledonia, Peru, and Thailand. Influenza B viruses were reported in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru), Asia (China, Japan, and Korea), Africa (South Africa), and North America (United States). Influenza B viruses were associated with widespread outbreaks in Brazil during May-June. 
Characterization of Influenza Virus Isolates
Human Infections with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Viruses
Since December 2003, nine countries (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam) have reported outbreaks of avian influenza A (H5N1) infection affecting poultry and, in some countries, other animals. As of October 25, a total of 44 laboratoryconfirmed cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection in humans had been reported in Vietnam and Thailand in 2004 (4) . Of these 44 patients, 32 died. The cases occurred in association with recurring H5N1 outbreaks among poultry in those countries.
Four human H5N1 cases occurred in Vietnam (three in children and one in a young adult) during July-September. In Thailand, four cases occurred in September and one case in October. The cases were associated with severe respiratory illness, with persons requiring hospitalization; all but one patient died. The cumulative case-fatality proportion for confirmed H5N1 cases since January 2004 is 73% (Vietnam: 27 cases, 20 deaths; Thailand: 17 cases, 12 deaths). The ongoing widespread epizootic of highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses in Asia remains a major concern. Since December 2003, nine Asian countries have reported H5N1 poultry outbreaks, with human cases reported from two of these countries. No evidence of sustained person-to-person transmission has been identified to date, although a probable instance of limited person-to-person transmission in a family cluster was identified recently in Thailand. CDC continues to recommend enhanced surveillance for suspected H5N1 cases among travelers with severe unexplained respiratory illness returning from H5N1-affected countries. Additional information about avian influenza is available at http:// www.phppo.cdc.gov/han/archivesys/viewmsgv.asp?alertnum=00209.
Influenza surveillance reports for the United States are published weekly during October-May and are available through CDC's voice (telephone, 888-232-3228) and fax (telephone, 888-232-3299, document number 361100) information systems and at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm. Additional information about influenza viruses, influenza surveillance, and the influenza vaccine is available at http:// www.cdc.gov/flu. Additional information about national WNV activity is available from CDC at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/ westnile/index.htm and at http://westnilemaps.usgs.gov. 
